**CURRICULUM VITAE**

Name: Ishtiyaque Haji

Title: Professor of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy

University of Calgary

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**EDUCATION**

College and University Education

Ph.D. 1989 University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Philosophy

M.A. 1984 Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC Canada, Philosophy

B.A. 1981 Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC Canada, Philosophy

Undergraduate Honors and Awards

Simon Fraser Open Undergraduate Scholarship, 2/81

Graduate Honors and Awards

University of Massachusetts Fellowship, 4/84-4/89

Aga Khan Foundation Canada Scholarship, 9/84-12/88

Simon Fraser Open Graduate Scholarship, 9/81-9/83

Areas of Specialization

Ethical Theory, Metaphysics (Free Will and Moral Responsibility), Philosophical Psychology

Areas of Competence

Philosophical Psychology, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of Religion, Action Theory

**EMPLOYMENT**

Professional Employment

University of Calgary, July 1, 2004 - , Professor

University of Minnesota, Morris (UMM):

2002 -2004 , Professor

1998 – 2002, Associate Professor

1992 – 1997, Assistant Professor

Simon Fraser University, 1990-1992, Assistant Professor

University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1989-1990, Assistant Professor

Sabbaticals and Leaves of Absence

Sabbatical (One year): U of C, 2024-2025

Sabbatical (One Semester): U of C, Winter 2018

CIH Fellow (U of C), 2005 - 2006, Fall 2015 – 2016

Sabbatical (One Semester): U of C, Fall 2013

Single Semester Leave (UMM), Fall 2003

Leave of Absence (UMM), Spring Quarter 1998.

Single Quarter Leave (UMM), Fall Quarter 1994.

**PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS AND HONORS**

Professional Organization Memberships

American Philosophical Association, 1988-present

Canadian Philosophical Association, 2004-present

The Southwestern Philosophical Society, 1994-present

Honors

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Grant, April 2017 – April 2021.

Calgary Institute for the Humanities, Annual Fellow, 2015-2016.

Institute of Philosophy, Catholic University of Leuven, Senior Research Fellow, Summer 2009

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Grant with Course Release, April 2008 – April 2011.

Institute of Philosophy, Catholic University of Leuven, Senior Research Fellow, Spring 2006

Calgary Institute for the Humanities, Annual Fellow, 2005-2006

Institute of Philosophy, Catholic University of Leuven, Senior Research Fellow, Fall 2003

UMM Faculty Distinguished Research Award, Spring 2002

McKnight Summer Fellowship, Summer 1998.

Institute of Philosophy, Catholic University of Leuven, Research Fellowship, Spring 1998.

President’s Minority Faculty Research Award, Summer 1997.

McKnight Summer Fellowship, Summer 1996.

NEH Summer Seminar on Moral Responsibility; Director: Peter French, The University of Colorado at Boulder, Summer 1995.

**SCHOLARLY, PROFESSIONAL, AND CREATIVE ACTIVITY**

**Conference Papers and Presentations**

“Forgiveness, Blameworthiness, and Impermissibility.” WCPA Keynote Presentation

(Saskatoon, U of Saskatchewan, September 28, 2024)

“Obligation Incompatibilism Defended,” CPA (Montreal, McGill), June 20, 2024.

“Motivating Traditional Compatibilism,” WCPA (Vancouver, UBC), October 21, 2023.

“Semicompatibilism,” WCPA (Victoria, U Vic), November 13, 2021.

“Twin Dilemmas,” CPA/Congress, UBC, June 1, 2019.

“A New Free Will Problem for Punishment,” Del Rosario University, Bogota May 16, 2019.

“Responsibility’s Influence on Obligation,” WCPA, Calgary, October 28, 2018.

“Ability and Obligation,” *Summer Solstice Ethics Conference* at UC Davis, California, 22 June 2018.

“Obligation Incompatibilism,” *Lund Gothenburg Responsibility Project Workshop*, June 5, 2018, Lund University, Sweden.

“Free Will, Obligation, and History,” Catholic University, Leuven, Belgium, June 27, 2017.

“The Obligation Dilemma,” University of Lethbridge, March 4, 2017.

“Prevailing Reasons as a Response to the Luck Objection,” conference on Free Will and Historical Perspectives, Bonn University, Bonn, Germany June 26, 2017.

“Freedom to do Otherwise and Forgiveness,” Congress of the Humanities and the Social Sciences, University of Calgary, June 1, 2016.

“Responsibility’s Influence on Obligation,” Homecoming Conference at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, October 24, 2015,

“Luck, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism,” 2015 Congress of the Humanities and the Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, May 31, 2015.

“Frankfurt Examples and Reasons Responsiveness,” Rosario University, Bogota, Columbia August 13, 2014.

“Obligation and Luck,” Rosario University, Bogota, Columbia, August 14, 2014.

“Author Meets Critics” and “Replies to my Critics,” APA Pacific Meetings, April 17, 2014, San Diego, California.

“Frankfurt Examples, Impermissibility, and Luck,” Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, December 13, 2013.

“On the Importance of Frankfurt Examples,” Department of Philosophy, Catholic University, Leuven, Belgium, September 6, 2013.

“Education’s Ultimate Aims and Freedom to do Otherwise,” Liberty Fund Conference on Education, ideals and practices, Park City, Utah, August 10, 2013.

“Blameworthiness and Alternate Possibilities,” Department of Philosophy, University of California, Davis, May 2, 2013.

“Semi-Compatibilism’s Scope,” Department of Philosophy, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, March 15, 2013

“Deterministic Frankfurt Examples,” 49th Western Canadian Philosophical Association

Meetings, Victoria, October 20, 2012.

“Blameworthiness for Permissible Options,” Second Latin American Analytic Philosophy Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 23, 2012.

“Historicism, Non-Historicism, or a Mix?” Central European University, Budapest, June 9, 2012.

“Event-Causal Libertarianism’s Control Conundrums,” Simon Fraser University, May 11, 2012.

“The Limits of Semi-Compatibilism,”48th Western Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Lethbridge, October 21, 2011.

“Reasons, Alternative Possibilities, and Obligation,” Conference on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Bogota, December 6, 2010.

“Frankfurt Examples, Reason, and Semi-Compatibilism,” Conference on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Bogota, December 7, 2010.

“Determinism and Responsibility,” Plenary Speaker, International Conference on East-West Comparative Philosophy, Seoul National University, October 15, 2010.

“Frankfurt Examples, Reason, and Semi-Compatibilism,” Distinguished Speaker Series, Seoul National University, October 14, 2010.

“On the Reason View of Freedom and Semi-Compatibilism,” 18th Bled Philosophical Conference, Bled, Slovenia, June 8, 2010.

“Frankfurt Examples, Obligation, and Semi-Compatibilism,” First Latin American Analytic Philosophy Conference, Merida, Mexico, April 16, 2010.

“Suberogation and Frankfurt Examples,” [co-authored with Paul McNamara, presented by McNamara] The Northern New England Philosophical Association, University of New Hampshire, Durham, October 17, 2009.

“Obligation, Reason, and Frankfurt Examples,” Institute of Analytic Philosophy, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, June 19, 2009.

“Comments on Dan Speak’s ‘Would Causal Determinism Cost Us Our Reasons,’APA (Vancouver), April 8, 2009.

“Freedom and Practical Reason,” 6th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy (Krakow), August 22, 2008

“The Reasons View of Freedom,” CPA 2008 Annual Congress (Vancouver), June 3, 2008.

“On Situationism and Moral Responsibility—Comments,” CPA 2008 (Vancouver), June 3, 2008.

“Freedom, Hedonism, and the Value of Worlds,” WCPA (Vancouver), October 14, 2006.

“Hard Incompatibilism, Value, and the Repugnant Conclusion,” Florida State University, Tallahassee, September 1, 2006.

“Hard- and Soft-Line Responses to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument,” 15th Bled

Philosophical Conference on Freedom, Determinism, and Responsibility, June 30, 2006.

“Source Incompatibilism, Desert, and the Value of Worlds,” University of Florida, Gainesville, February 20, 2006.

“Responsibility, Global Induction, and Authenticity,” Fifth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy, University of Lisbon, August 29, 2005.

“On Paternalism, Autonomy, and Freedom,” Catholic University, Leuven, Conference on Autonomy and Paternalism, May 26, 2005.

“Wholly Intrinsically Motivated Actions and Moral Appraisability,” Vancouver, B.C., November 20, 2004.

“A Riddle Concerning Huckleberry’s Akratic Act,” University of Alberta, October 15, 2004.

Comments on Lynne Baker’s, “Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism,” University of

Rotterdam, October 13, 2003.

“Appraisability,” Catholic University of Leuven, October 1, 2003.

“Freedom, Obligation, and Responsibility,” University of Calgary, Calgary, January 13, 2003.

“Prospects for a Unifying Theory,” Arizona State University, Tempe, October 11, 2002.

“Control Requirements of Deontic Morality and Moral Responsibility: A Unifying Theory,” University

of Manitoba, Winnipeg, April 5, 2002.

“Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments,” Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Laval

University, Quebec City, May 27, 2001.

“Libertarian Openness, Blameworthiness, and Time,” Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference,

University of Idaho-Moscow, April 29, 2001.

“Frankfurt-Type Examples and Deontic Acts,” Pacific Division Meetings of the American

Philosophical Association, Albuquerque, April 7, 2000.

“The Suberogatory and Blameworthiness,” Bowling Green University, February 25, 2000.

“Control Requirements for Moral Appraisals: An Asymmetry,” Greater Philadelphia Philosophy

Forum, Bryn Mawr College, October 2, 1999.

“Indeterminism, Luck, and Responsibility,” Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Forum, Bryn Mawr

College, October 2, 1999.

“On Fischer on Taking Responsibility,” Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Forum, Bryn Mawr College, October 2, 1999.

“On The Value of Ultimate Responsibility,” International conference on Moral Responsibliity and Ontology, Zeist, The Netherlands, June 5, 1998.

“The Relative Unimportance of Moral Responsibility,” Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, April 2, 1998.

“The Supererogatory, the Suberogatory, and Appraisability,” Davidson College, North Carolina,

February 12, 1998.

“Moral Anchors and Control,” University of North Carolina at Greensboro, February 13, 1998.

“Overridingness,” Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Oakland, CA, March 1997.

“On Reason’s Dethroning Morality,” Meetings of the Minnesota Philosophical Society; Bethel College, October 1996.

“Cultural Norms a Moral Responsibility,” presented at the Eastern Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, April 1996.

“Addiction and Control,” presented at conference on *Moral Responsibility in Public and Private Life*, hosted by the Department of Philosophy, SUNY-Plattsburgh, April 12, 1996.

“Cultural Norms and Blameworthiness,” 18th International Wittgenstein Symposium,

Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, August 1995.

“Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Induced Pro-Attitudes,” delivered at Simon Fraser

University, November 1994.

“Changing Obligations and Immutable Blameworthiness,” delivered at the Meetings of the Minnesota Philosophical Society; St. Cloud State University, October 1993.

“Some Problems with Hierarchical Accounts of Autonomy” delivered at the Western Division Meetings of the Canadian Philosophical Association; Vancouver, October 1991.

“Pre- and Post-Vital Times,” University of British Columbia, Fall 1990.

**Other Presentations**

“Twin Dilemmas,” U of Calgary, Philosophy Seminar Session, November 11, 2018.

“Blameworthiness and Alternative Possibilities,” First Annual Graduate Philosophy Conference

at the University of Calgary, April 14, 2012.

“Freedom and Reason,” PPUPAC, University of Calgary, March 14, 2008.

“Source Incompatibilism, Desert, and Pleasure,” CIH Lecture, University of Calgary, Nov. 15, 2005.

“Multiples and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” McKnight Presentation, UMM, March, 9, 1999.

“The Five-Fold Islamic Model of Obligation and Blameworthiness,” UMM, February 19, 1998.

Author Meets Students Session: “Appraisability,” Davidson College, February 12, 1998.

“Intercultural Attributions of Blame,” University of Colorado at Boulder, NEH Summer Seminar

Group, July 1995.

“Fischer on Responsibility for Omissions,” University of Colorado at Boulder, NEH Summer Seminar Group, July 1995.

“Blameworthiness and Cultural Norms,” Faculty Seminar Talk, UMM, May 1995.

**Publications**

***Books***

*Obligation and Responsibility*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023.

*The Obligation Dilemma*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.

*Luck’s Mischief: Obligation and Blameworthiness on a Thread*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

*Reason’s Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

*Freedom and Value: Freedom’s Influence on Welfare and Worldly Value.* Dordrecht: Springer, 2009.

*Incompatibilism’s Allure:Principal Arguments for Incompatibilism.* Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2009.

*Moral Responsibility, Authenticity, and Normative Education.* New York: Routledge, 2008 [Co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers].

*Deontic Morality and Control.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

*Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

***Anthologies***

*Free Will and Moral Responsibility*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013. Co-edited with Justin Caouette.

***Articles***

*Forthcoming:*

“Freedom, Forgiveness, and Determinism,”in Adam Green, ed. *Forgiveness*, Oxford University Press (2024).

*In Print:*

“Further Reflections on Lemos’s Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Action,” *Journal of Philosophical Theological Research* 25 (2023): 119-130.

“Obligation and Moral Responsibility,” in J. Campbell, K. M. Miclelson, A. White, eds. *A Companion to Free Will.* Oxford: Blackwell 2023, 95-107.

“Libertarianism and Luck,” *Journal of Philosophical Theological Research* 24 (2022): 115-34.

“Semicompatibilism Imperiled,” *Theoria* 88 (2022): 799 – 811.

“Blameworthiness and Time,” *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 98 (2021): 446-462.

“Divine and Conventional Frankfurt Examples,” *Journal of Philosophical Theological Research* 23 (2021): 51-72.

“Obligation Incompatibilism and Blameworthiness,” *Philosophical Papers* 50 (2021): 163-185.

“Love and Free Agency,” in Simon Cushing, ed. *New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving*. Palgrave, Macmillan (2021): 151-169.

“Radical Reversal Cases and Normative Appraisals,” *Criminal Law and Philosophy* 15 (2021): 271-284.

“Free Will and Forgiveness,” in M. McKenna, D. Nelkin, and B. Warmke, eds. *Forgiveness and its Moral Dimensions*. New York: Oxford University Press (2021), 101-126.

“Praise,” Entry in the *International Encyclopedia of Ethics*. Routledge, 2019.

“Frankfurt-Style Examples, Impermissibility, and Reasons Responsiveness,” in Michael Sevel and Allan McCay eds. *Free Will and the Law: New Perspectives*. New York: Routledge, 85-104.

“A Paradox Concerning Frankfurt Examples,” *Synthese* 196 (2019): 87-103.

“Indeterministic Choice and Ability,” *The Journal of Ethics* 22 (2018): 191-203 (with Ryan Hebert).

“Ability, Frankfurt Examples, and Obligation,” *The Journal of Ethics* 22 (2018): 163-90 (with Ryan Hebert).

“Obligation, Responsibility, and History.” *The Journal of Ethics* 22 (2018): 1-23.

“Do Compatibilists Need Alternative Possibilities?” *Erkenntnis* 82 (2017): 1085-1095.

“Empathy, Salient Alternatives, and Culpability,” in Heidi L. Maibom, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy.* Routledge (2017): 253-263.

“Reflections on Obligation and Blameworthiness,” in Z. H. Goldberg, ed. *Reflections on Ethics and Responsibility: Essays in Honor of Peter A. French*. Springer (2017): 85-99.

“The Obligation Dilemma,” *The* *Journal of Ethics* 21 (2017): 37-61.

“The Extended Luck Problem,” *The Journal of Ethics* 20 (2016): 191-218.

“Luck, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism,” *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review* 54 (2016): 611-31.

“Obligation, Ability, and Blameworthiness.” In M. Kuhler and M. van Ackeren, eds. *The Limits of Moral Obligation.* New York: Routledge (2016): 131-46.

“Skepticism About Autonomy and Education as Ultimate Aims—What Next?” In A. Buckareff, C. Moya, and S. Rosell, eds. *Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility*. London: Palgrave Macmillan (2015): 251-68. [co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers.]

“Education’s Ultimate Aims and Freedom to do Otherwise,” *Social Philosophy and Policy* 31 (2014): 81-108.

“Blameworthiness and Alternate Possibilities,” *The* *Journal of Value Inquiry* 48 (2014): 603-21.

“Responsibility for Emotions, Alternative Possibilities, and Reasons.” In David Palmer ed. *Libertarian Free Will: Essays for Robert Kane*. New York: Oxford University Press (2014): 127-41.

“Luck, the Range of Obligations, and Frankfurt Examples,” *Philosophical Papers* 43 (2014): 317-44.

“Event-Causal Libertarianism’s” Control Conundrums,” *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 88 (2013): 227-46.

“Seven Questions About Free Will and Moral Responsibility,” *Methode* 2 (2013): 54-65.

“Critical Notice: Michael McKenna’s Conversation and Responsibility,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 43 (2013): 267-86.

“Semicompatibilism’s Scope.” In Ish Haji and Justin Caouette, eds., *Free Will and Moral Responsibility*. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013: 142-64.

“Introduction: Mapping The Terrain.” In Ish Haji and Justin Caouette, eds., *Free Will and Moral Responsibility.* Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013: 1-25 [Co-authored with Justin Caouette.]

“Historicism, Non-Historicism, or a Mix?” *The Journal of Ethics* 17 (2013): 185-204.

“Architecture, Ethical Perception, and Educating for Moral Responsibility,” *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 47 (2013): 1-23. [co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers and Yannick Joye].

“Modest Libertarianism and Practical Reason,” *Philosophical Issues* 22 (2012): 201-16.

“Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics,” *The Journal of Ethics* 16 (2012): 175-209.

“Overridingness and Just Plain Ought.” In S. Schleidgen, ed., *Should we always act morally? Essays on Overridingness*. (Marburg: Tectum, 2012.)

“On the Reason View of Freedom and Semi-Compatibilism,” *Acta Analytica* 26 (2011): 343-53.

“Ultimate Educational Aims, Overridingness, and Personal Well-Being,” *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 30 (2011): 543-56 [co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers]

“Disenabling Levy’s Frankfurt-style Enabling Cases,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 92 (2011): 400-14 [co-authored with Michael McKenna].

“Obligation, Reason, and Frankfurt Examples.” In Robert Kane, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd Ed.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011): 288-305.

“Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 40 (2010): 385-410.

“Psychopathy, Ethical Perception, and Moral Culpability,” *Neuroethics* 3 (2010): 135-50.

“The Inauthentic Evaluative Schemes of Psychopaths and Culpability.” In Luca Malatesti and John McMillan, eds., *Responsibility and Psychopathy Interfacing Law, Psychiatry, and Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010): 261-81.

“Intrinsic Value, Alternative Possibilities, and Reason,” *The Journal of Ethics* 14 (2010): 149-71.

“On the Viability of Semi-Compatibilism,” *Ideas y Valores: Columbian Journal of Philosophy* 58 (2009): 125-40.

“On the Direct Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Moral Responsibility,”*Grazer Philosophische Studien* 80 (2010): 111-30.

“Incompatibilism’s Threat to Worldly Value: Source Incompatibilism, Desert, and Pleasure,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 78 (2009): 621-45.

“Freedom and Practical Reason,” *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 12 (2009): 169-79.

“A Conundrum Concerning Creation,” *Sophia* 48 (2009): 1-14.

“Freedom Presuppositions of Normative Appraisals,” in Jesus Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff, eds., *Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions* (Automatic Press/VIP 2009), pp. 69-85.

“Authenticity-Sensitive Preferentism, Educating for Well-Being, and Autonomy,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 42 (2008): 85-106 [co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers].

“Education for Well-Being and Autonomy,” *Theory and Research in Education* 6 (2008): 71-93 [co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers].

“Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation,” *The Journal of Ethics* 12 (2008): 239-61.

“On Frankfurt-Type Examples,” *APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law* 7 (2008): 1-5.

“Dispositional Compatibilism and Frankfurt-Type Examples,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 89 (2008): 226-41.

“Reflections on the Incompatibilist’s Direct Argument,” *Erkenntnis* 68 (2008): 1-19.

“Obligation and Luck,” in Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen, eds., *Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility* (Cambridge Scholars Press 2008), pp. 163-85.

“Modest Libertarianism, Luck, and Control: Reply to Gerald Harrison,” *Polish Journal of Philosophy* 1 (2007): 77-89.

“Love Imperiled,” *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy* 3 (2007): 5-20 [co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers].

“Magical Agents, Global Induction, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 85 (2007): 343-71 [co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers].

“Authentic Education and Moral Responsibility,” the *Journal of Applied Ethics* 24 (2007): 78-94 [co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers].

“Hard- and Soft-Line Responses to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument,” *Acta Analytica* 21 (2006): 19-35 [co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers].

“Frankfurt Examples, Obligation, and Responsibility,” *Journal of Ethics* 10 (2006): 255-281.

“Defending Frankfurt’s Argument in Deterministic Contexts: A Reply to Palmer,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 103 (2006): 363-72 [co-authored with Michael McKenna].

“Education for Critical Thinking: Can it be Non-Indoctrinative?” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 38 (2006): 723-43 [co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers].

“On the Ultimate Responsibility of Collectives, *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 30 (2006): 292-308.

“The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and a Defeated Dilemma,” *Philosophical Explorations* 9 (2006): 179-202.

“Foreknowledge, Freedom, and Obligation,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 86 (2005): 321-39.

“Libertarianism, Luck, and Action Explanation,” *The Journal of Philosophical Research* 30 (2005): 321-40.

“Moral Responsibility, Love, and Authenticity,” the *Journal of Social Philosophy* 36 (2005): 106-26 [co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers].

“Responsibility and the Problem of Manipulation Reconsidered,” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 12 (2004): 439-64 [co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers].

“Freedom, Obligation, and Responsibility: Prospects for a Unifying Theory,” *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 29 (2005): 106-25.

“Freedom, Hedonism, and the Intrinsic Value of Lives,” *Philosophical Topics* 32 (2004): 131-51.

“Active Control, Agent-Causation, and Free Action,” *Philosophical Explorations* 7 (2004): 131-48.

“Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate about Freedom and Alternative Possibilities,” [co-authored with Michael McKenna], *The Journal of Philosophy* 101 (2004): 299-314; reprinted in *Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, ed. John Martin Fischer (Routledge, 2005).

“Alternate Possibilities, Personal Autonomy, and Moral Responsibility,” in James S. Taylor, ed., *Personal Autonomy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

“Libertarian Openness, Blameworthiness, and Time,” in J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, D. Shier, eds., *Freedom and Determinism Volume II, Topics in Contemporary Philosophy* (7 Bridges Press, 2004), pp. 135-50.

“Flickers of Freedom, Obligation, and Responsibility,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 40 (2003): 287-302.

“Alternative Possibilities, Luck, and Moral Responsibility,” *The Journal of Ethics* 7 (2003): 253-75.

“The Emotional Depravity of Psychopaths,” *Legal Theory* 9 (2003): 63-82.

“Determinism and its Threat to the Moral Sentiments,” *The Monist* 86 (2003): 244-62.

“Appraisals of Virtue and Value,” *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review* 41 (2002): 349-62.

“Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility,” in Robert Kane, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

“Self-Deception and Blameworthiness,” *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior* 31 (2001): 279-95.

“Libertarian Free Will and CNC Manipulation,” *Dialectica: International Journal of Philosophy* (Switzerland) 55 (2001): 221-38 [co-authored with Stefaan Cuypers].

“Control Conundrums: Modest Libertarianism, Responsibility, and Explanation,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 82 (2001): 178-200.

“Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Three Recent Views,” *The Journal of Ethics* 4 (2000). This special edition of *The Journal of Ethics* on free will and responsibility contains, among other contributions of mine, three articles:

“Libertarianism and the Luck Objection,” pp. 329-37.

“Control Requirements for Moral Appraisals: An Asymmetry,” pp. 351-56.

“On Responsibility, History, and Taking Responsibility,” pp. 392-400.

“Indeterminism, Explanation, and Luck,” *The Journal of Ethics* 4 (2000): 211-35.

“Death and Asymmetries in Moral Appraisals,” *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 24 (2000): 135-50.

“Alternate Possibilities and Responsibility,” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 31 (2000): 259-67.

“Moral Anchors and Control,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 29 (1999): 175-203.

“Indeterminism and Frankfurt-Type Examples,” *Philosophical Explorations* 1 (1999): 42-58.

“On Being Morally Responsible in a Dream,” in G.B. Matthews, ed., *The Augustinian Tradition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999): 166-82.

“On the Value of Ultimate Responsibility,” in Ton van den Beld, ed., *Moral Responsibility and Ontology* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).

“On Psychopaths and Culpability,” *Law and Philosophy* 17 (1998): 117-40.

“Frankfurt Pairs and Varieties of Blameworthiness: Epistemic Morals,” *Erkenntnis* 47 (1998): 351-377.

“Multiple Selves and Culpability,” *Legal Theory* 3 (1997): 249-71.

“Liberating Constraints,” *The Journal of Philosophical Research* 22 (1997): 261-87.

“An Epistemic Dimension of Blameworthiness,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57 (1997): 523-65.

“Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Induced Pro-Attitudes,” *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review* 35 (1996): 703-20.

“Blameworthiness and Cultural Norms,” *The Journal of Social Philosophy* 27 (1996): 116-35.

“Consequential Perfectionism,” *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review* 35 (1996): 109-15. “Variable Obligations and Enduring Commands,” *Sophia* 34 (1995): 5-14.

“Cultural Norms and Blameworthiness,” in K.S. Johannessen and T. Nordenstam, eds., *Culture and Value Philosophy and the Cultural Sciences, Papers of the 18th International Wittgenstein Symposium* (The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 1995).

“Changing Obligations and Immutable Blameworthiness,” *Theoria* 60 (1994): 48-62.

“Consequential Omnibenevolence,” *Grazer Philosophisce Studien* 47 (1994): 207-22.

Critical Notice of Fred Feldman’s: *Confrontations With the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death*, *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review* 33 (1994): 677-84.

“Doing the Best We Can and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” *Southwest Philosophy Review* 10 (1994): 113-27.

“Autonomy and Blameworthiness,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 24 (1994): 512-613.

“Intentional Action and Moral Responsibility: Mele on the Springs of Action,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 24 (1994): 511-24.

“Alternative Possibilities, Moral Obligation, and Moral Responsibility,” *Philosophical Papers* 22 (1993): 41-50.

“A Deadly Dilemma,” *Cogito* 6 (1992): 143-49.

“A Riddle Regarding Omissions,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 22 (1992): 485-500.

“Evolution, Altruism, and the Prisoner's Dilemma,” *Biology and Philosophy* 7 (1992): 161-75.

“Escaping or Avoiding the Prisoner's Dilemma?,” *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review* 30 (1991): 153-92.

“Pre-Vital and Post-Vital Times,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 25 (1991): 171-80

“Hampton on Hobbes On State-of-Nature Cooperation,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 51 (1991): 589-601.

“The Unresolved Puzzle About Posthumous Predication,” *Grazer Philosophiche Studien*

38 (1990): 187-93.

“The Symmetry Enigma in Hobbes,” *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review* 29 (1990): 189-204.

“God and Omnispatiality,” *International Journal For Philosophy of Religion* 25 (1989): 99-108.

“The Compliance Problem,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 70 (1989): 105-21.

***Book Reviews and Guest Editor***

*Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account* by Scott Sehon.

*Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2016.11.09. [Electronic Publication]

*From Morality to the End of Reason* by Ingmar Persson. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2014.06.23. [Electronic Publication]

*Nature’s Challenge to Free Will* by Bernard Berofsky. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2012.07.43. [Electronic Publication].

*Free Will and Reactive Attitudes*, edited by Michael McKenna and Paul Russell, *The Philosophical Quarterly* 60 (2010): 213-218.

*Distributed Cognition and the Will*, edited by D. Ross, S. Spurrett, H. Kincaid, and G. Lynn Stephens, *Philosophical Papers* 37 (2008): 491-500.

*My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility* by John Martin Fischer*. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2006.05.17. [Electronic Publication].

Guest Editor: Book Symposium on John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s *Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Philosophical Explorations* 8 (2005).

*The Mental Basis of Responsibility* by Walter Glannon*, The Journal of Value Inquiry* 38 (2004): 575-580.

*Autonomous Agents* by Alfred R. Mele, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* forthcoming.

*Self-Governance and Cooperation* by Robert Myers, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 66 (2003): 498-501.

*Responsibility and Punishment* by J. Angelo Corlett, *Mind* 44 (2002): 847-51.

*The Architecture of Reason* by Robert Audi, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2002.03.09 [Electronic publication].

*On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally Matters* by Mark H. Bernstein, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 63 (2001): 730-33.

***Works in Progress*:**

“Obligation Requirements of Forgiveness”

**Grants Received**

***Within the University (University of Calgary)***

SSHRC Enhancement Grant (July 2012)

Scholarly Activities Grant (1st Annual Graduate Philosophy Conference), March 2012

Visiting Scholars Grant (Bob Kane), Winter 2008

Career Development Grant, Spring 2005

CIH Fellowship, Fall 2005

Visiting Scholars Grant (Al Mele), Fall 2004

***Outside the University (University of Calgary)***

SSHRC Insight Grant April 2017 – March 2024

SSHRC (with course release) April 2008 – April 2011

SSHRC Enhancement Grant April 2012 – September 2013

***Within the University (UMM)*:**

Out-of-State Travel Subsidy, June 2003

ISP Travel Grant, Summer 2003

McKnight Travel Grant, Summer 2003

UMM Instructional Technology Mentorship Grant, Fall 2002

Out-of-State Travel Subsidy, January 2002.

Grant from the International Programs Committee to internationalize the curriculum, 6/15/00-12/15/00.

University of Minnesota Graduate Summer Faculty Research Fellowship, Summer 1998.

Out-of-State Travel Subsidy, August 1997.

Grant-In-Aid, June 1997.

In-State Travel Subsidy, October 1996.

Out-of-State Travel Subsidy, August 1996.

University of Minnesota Graduate Summer Faculty Research Fellowship, Summer 1996.

International Travel Subsidy from the Institute of International Studies and Programs, August 1995.

Out-of-State Travel Subsidy, August 1995.

Grant from the International Programs Committee for Internationalizing the Curriculum, 6/94-12/94.

Professional Development Grant, 1993-94.

Grant from the International Programs Committee for Internationalizing the curriculum, 6/93-12/93.

***Outside the University (UMM)*:**

Grant from the Minnesota Humanities Commission for the 28th Midwest Philosophy Colloquium(Title: *Philosophy of Religion: Body and Soul*), 8/15/2003-5/15/2004

Grant from the Minnesota Humanities Commission for the 27th Midwest Philosophy Colloquium (Title: *Free Will*), 8/15/2002-5/15/2003

Grant from the Minnesota Humanities Commission for the 26th Midwest Philosophy Colloquium (Title: *The Wisdom of the Ancients*), 8/15/2001-5/15/2002.

Grant from the Minnesota Humanities Commission for the 25th Midwest Philosophy Colloquium (Title: *Irrational Human Conduct*), 8/15/2000-5/15/2001.

Grant from the Minnesota Humanities Commission for the 24th Midwest Philosophy Colloquium (Title: *Concerns of Privacy*), 8/15/99-5/15/00.

Grant from the Minnesota Humanities Commission for the 23rd Midwest Philosophy Colloquium (Title: *The Mentally Ill Offender*), 9/15/98-6/15/99.

Grant from the Minnesota Humanities Commission for the 22nd Midwest Philosophy Colloquium (Title: *Responsibility Matters*), 9/15/97-6/15/98.

Grant from the U.S. West Corporation for the 22nd Midwest Philosophy Colloquium (Title: *Responsibility Matters*), 9/15/97-6/15/98.

Grant from the Minnesota Humanities Commission for the 21st Midwest Philosophy Colloquium, 9/15/96-6/15/97.

Grant from the Minnesota Humanities Commission for the 20th Midwest Philosophy Colloquium, 9/15/95-6/15/96.

Grant from the Minnesota Humanities Commission for the 19th Midwest Philosophy Colloquium, 9/15/94-6/15/95.

Grant from the Minnesota Humanities Commission for the 18th Midwest Philosophy Colloquium, 9/15/93-6/15/94.

**SERVICE**

**University of Calgary Service**

***Committees*:**

Chair, WCPA 2010

Prelim Examinations Committee Chair (Ethics), Fall 2008-

Graduate Director, July 2007-July 2012

Graduate Placement Director, Fall 2006-June 2007

Speakers’ Committee, Winter 2005 - 2007

Search Committee (Religion/Ethics Position), Fall 2004-Spring 2005

Prelim Examinations Committee (Ethics), Fall 2004-

Graduate Committee, Fall 2004 – Winter 2024

Speakers Program Committee, Winter 2014-2015

Philosophy of Children Committee, Fall 2018-2019

FGS, Graduate Scholarship Committee, Fall 2018-2019

Arts Appeals, 2023 - 2024